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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
LORAINE J. WHITE,
Plaintiff and App·eUee,

-vs.NATIONAL POSTAL TRANS-PORT
ASSOCIATION, formerly RAILWAY MAIL ASSOCIATION,

Case No.
7829

D ef end{]Jnt and App-ellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FAC-TS
This appeal is taken from a jury verdict in an action
brought on a pro;vision for the payment of death benefits
for accidental death contained in the Certificate, Constitution, and By-Laws of the Defendant association, of
which Plaintiff's husband was a member at the time of
his death.
In accordance with its C-onstitution and By-Laws,
(Ex. 6) Defendant association issued to Milton H. White,
husband of Plaintiff, a certificate (Ex. A) providing
for the payment· of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

if death resulted from accidental injuries alone. The
certificate provides:
"Provided, however, no benefit or sum whatsoever shall be payable in any case whatsoever
unless the accident alone results in producing visible, external marks of injury or violence suffered
by the body of the member, nor unless the death or
disability results wholly from the injury and within one year from the date thereof. Nor shall any
benefit be paid for death or disability which results from voluntary inflicted injuries, be a member sane or insane, nor from poison or other in. jurious matter taken or administered accidentally
or otherwise; nor as the result of any surgical
operation."
"Accidental death shall be construed to be
either sudden, violent death from external violent
and accidental means resulting directly, independently and exclusively of any othe-r causes; and not
the direct or indirect result of the member's own
vicious or unlawful conduct; or death within one
year as the sole result of accidental me.ans alone.
There shall be no liability whatever when disease,
defect, or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause
of deat-h. The Railway Mail Association shall not
be liable for any claims arising from appendicitis
caused by trauma or otherwise." (Italics supplied)
The Constitution and By-Laws of the Association
which are incorporated by reference·, as of the date of
death, by the provisions of the certificate (Ex. A), provide at page 38 of Ex. 6 as follows :
"Accidental death and external injuries are
defined to be either sudden, violent death or accidental injuries from violent and accidental mean~
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alone resulting directly, independently and exclusiYelv of all other causes and not the result of
1nembe~'s o'Yn vicious, intemperate, or unlawful
conduct, and producing visible marks or other evidence of injury or violence on or within the body
of the n1ember. There shall be no liability whate,ver, unless death or disability results wholly
from the injury, nor when a.ny disease, defect, or
bodily infirmity ,is a contributing cause of death,
disability, or injury, nor shall any benefit be paid
when death or disability results from voluntary
inflicted injuries by the member, be he sane or
insane, nor from any anesthetic, poison, or drug
taken or administered accidently or otherwise,
nor as the result of any surgical operation, nor by
reason of the administration of an anesthetic
prior to surgical operation, nor during any other
preparation for surgical operation (except where
the surgical treatment or preparation thereof is
made necessary by an accident), nor as a result
of any surgical, electrical, sani-practice, osteo. .
pathic or chiropractic treatment, or treatment of
any sort intended to cure or alleviate mental or
bodily ills, whether self-administered by the Inember or by any other p·erson whomsoever, nor shall
benefits cover nor extend to any of the following
conditions, to-wit: appendicitis, fits, epilepsy,
mental infirmity, ptomaine poisoning, bacterial
infection (except a pyogenic infection occurring
with and through an accidental cut or wound),
arthritis, varicocele, cerebral hemorrhage, menigeal hemorrhage, spinal hemorrhage, heat prostration, sunstroke or sunburn, nor epididymitis
or orchitis (unless caused by direct trauma)."
(Italics supplied)
·
The facts as to the life, illness, injury, and death
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of Milton H. White are not in dispute. Plaintiff testified as to the accident in August, 1949, and the incidents surrounding his last moments. Plaintiff also produced two physicians, one a heart specialist, who attended Mr. White during his lifetime. Defendant also
produced a heart specialist. All of the medical testimony
was in substantial agreement. The only dispute is the
application of the contractual provisions contained in the
certificate and in the Constitution and By-Laws to the
facts developed at the trial.
The evidence shows that Mr. White was at the time
of his death on February 14, 1950, aged 63. (Ex. 2) He
was suffering from rheumatic heart disease resulting
from rheumatic fever in childhood. He had been under
medical treatment by Dr. Edward P. Goddard for this
heart condition for about one year prior to injury claimed
by Plaintiff to have been the sole cause of death. (TR.
66) As a p·art of his treatment, he had been given mercuhydrin and thiomerin ( TR 55), medicines characterized by his attending physician ( TR 70-73) as typical
of advanced heart disease and congestive heart failure.
A typical symptom of his heart condition, auricular fibrillation, was the throwing out of emboli or frag1nents
of blood clots (TR 54) which are pumped out into the
body and may block the circulation in an extremity or a
vital organ of the body. (TR 79) While under treatment
and observation by Dr. Goddard, he had at least two
of these typical embolic episodes ( TR 71), one in the
spleen and the other in the leg. Subsequently, while
under treatment by Dr. Olson, a heart specialist, he had
4
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a third in the kidney or abdo1ninal area. ( TR 55) A
fourth embolus struck his brain on February 14, 1950,
and caused his death (TR 56 and Exs. 2 and 3), in the
opinion of Dr. Olson, the attending physician who testified for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified that on August 25, 1949, while she
and her husband were on a trip visiting relatives in
Dodge City, Kansas, ~Ir. White received a bump on the
rear calf of the right leg. The injury occurred when a
bench being moved stuck, and when jerked loose, its
corner struck 1Ir. \V.hite in the rear of his leg. The blow
rnade no mark at the time (TR 8) but commenced to discolor on the way home to Ogden. When the Whites returned to Ogden on September 3, 1949, Dr. Goddard was
called and 1Ir. White was placed in St. Benedict's Hospital with congestiv~ heart failure (TR 67) at which time
Dr. Olson was called in as a heart specialist. On S.eptember 8, an embolectomy was performed (Ex. 4 and
TR 38) to remove a clot in the artery of the leg. Some
clot was removed (TR 38), but the circulation of the leg
did not improve, gangrene set in (TR 39), and on October 29, 1949 (Ex. 4), the leg was amputated above the
knee. A pathological examination (Ex. 5) of the amputated portion of the leg developed that Mr. White had
also been suffering from obliterating thromboangiitis
of the vessels of the right leg, which condition is also
known as Buerger's Disease (TR 45 and 73).
Mr. White's recovery from the amputation operation
was normal. The wound healed properly, and discussion
was being had with respect to fitting him with an arti5
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ficial leg. (TR 72-73) But on the evening of F'ebruary
13-14, 1950, White, after an attack of nausea, had what
amounted to a convulsion, slipped off the bed and died.
Dr. Olson was called, pronounced Mr. White dead on his
arrival, and fixed the immediate cause of death as cerebral artery embolism. (Ex. 2) That was still his opinion
on the day of the trial. (TR 56, 57) That was also the
opinion of Dr. Peltzer, the heart specialist called by the
Defendant association. (TR 81) Dr. Goddard, the only
other medical expert called by Plaintiff, stated in the
application for benefits filed with the Defendant association (Ex. 1), "This man has since expired, at which
time I was not in attendance, but apparently due to his
heart disease." Dr. Goddard further testified at the trial
that he was in no position to venture an opinion as to
the cause of death due to the fact that he was not present
at Mr. White's death (TR 70).
Application for benefits was filed by Plaintiff with
the Defendant association on May 5, 1950. The claim
was denied on the ground that the accidental bump on the
leg in August 1949 was not directly, independently and
exclusively the cause of the death, but that lhe heart disease and Buerger's Disease were, at least, contributing
causes. Thereafter, this suit was instituted in February
1951.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
{a)

TillS CASE AT LEAST BELONGS IN CATEGORY THREE OF

Browning v. Equitable Life.
_ {b)

PLAINTIFF

FAILED

TO

MEET

HER

BURDEN

OF PROOF.

POINT II.
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

POINT III.
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING THE JURY
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

Contractual provisions similar to the ones in this
case have been before this court some half dozen times
since 1937. The first of this series,

Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurwnce
Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 Pac. 2nd 1060
established the law of this state in interpreting the
"accidental means alone" clause. The Browning case concerned a claim for disability payments by a dentist who
had sprained his finger in an accident. The policy covered loss "resulting directly and independently of all
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other ~ause~s, from bodily injuries effected during the
term of this policy, solely through external, violent, and
accidental means." The court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Larsen, outlined three categories in which cases
arising under similar policies or similar clauses have
been classified. These are :
" (1) When an accident causes a diseased
condition which, together with the accident, results in the injury or death complained of, the
accident alone is to be considered the cause of
the injury or death.
"(2) When, at the time of the accident, the
insured was suffering from some disease, but the
disease had no causal connection with the injury
or death resulting from the accident, the accident
is to be considered the sole cause.
"(3) When, at the time of the accident,
there was an existing disease which cooperating
with the accident resulted in the injury or death 7
the accident cannot be considered as the sole
cause or as the cause independent of all other
causes." (72 Pac. 2nd 1073).

Mr. Justice Wolfe, in his dissenting opinion on
rehearing of
Browning vs. Equitable Life, 80 Pac. 2nd
348 at 353
further breaks down category (3) as follows:
"These words must, by their plain and inevitable meaning, exclude liability for any disability where either (1) the sole- cause was other
than the injury, or ( 2) the preponderating cause
of disability was any other cause than the injury
8
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effected solely through external, violent and accidentalineans, or (3) 'vhere there was an efficient
concurring cause besides the injury, and such
concurring cause 'vas not produced or set in
motion by the accident or injury."
The point 'vhich divided the court in the Browning
case and which "'"as the issue in the five cases subsequently consid~red by this court was the choice of
category and the Inethod of making that choice.
The Lee case,
Lee vs. New York Life Insurance Co., 95 Utah
445, 82 Pac. 2nd 178,
added a new corollary to category two, as stated by the
court,
HThe rule, as we believe it to be on the facts
which this jury was justified in finding, is that
where an accidental injury sets in motion or starts
activity of a latent or dormant disease, and such
disease contributes to the death after having been
so precipita ted by the accident, the disease is
not a direct or indirect cause of death nor a
contributing cause in the meaning of the terms
of the policy, but the accident which started the
mischief and precipitated the condition resulting
in death is the sole cause of death."
In,
Clayton vs. New York Life Insurance Co.,
96 Utah 331, 85 Pac. 2nd 819,
the trial court found sufficient conflict in the evidence
to submit to the jury a determination of whether the
accident caused the disabling illness. The jury having
so found, this court affirmed and placed it in category
one saying,
9
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"In the case at bar, it was permissible for
the: jury to find that the respondent's appendix
was not diseased or infected prior to the blow,
and that the blow to the abdomen was the sole
cause of the appendicitis and disability, without
any question of pre-existent condition or concurrent, contributing cause." (85 Pac. 2nd 819 at
822).

In
Hanley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Neu,
York, 106 Utah 184, 147 Pac. 2nd 319

the assured suffered a blow in the groin from the fall of
a heavy steel bar, causing a hernia. He was later operated on for the hernia and died very suddenly from
pulmonary embolism. The case would clearly have come
within category one and the company held liable but
for the fact that over 90 days had intervened between
the injury and the death, an excluding condition of the
policy. The court did, however, allow recovery on a
theory, not pertinent to the case at bar, that the surgical operation was a violent external and accidental
means within the policy if the resulting death from the
surgery was unexpected. The effect of this theory on
surgical operation cases was clarified in
Kellogg vs. California Western States Life
Insurance Co., ______ Utah ______ , 201 Pac. 2nd 949,

where recovery on the policy was denied when, because
of the poor physical condition of the assured, postoperative shock was expected, and the death, therefore,
not accidental.
Tucker vs. New York Life Insuranc·e Co.,
107 Utah 478, 155 Pac. 2nd 173
10
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fell in category three. In that case, the decedent slipped
on the ice and fractured his arm on November 19, 1941.
He died on December 7, 1941, from a dissecting aneurism
of the aorta. The evidence showed that he had high
blood pressure caused by atherosclerosis, which had
been a chronic condition, for which he had been tre-ated
for about a year. The undisputed medical testimony
was that the aorta gave way as a result of a diseased
condition which had so weakened the artery that it could
not stand the increased blood pressure caused by the
fall or strain after the injury. This court reversed
the lower court and held that it should have given a
directed verdict in favor of the defendants, stating,
"Mr. Nichols' condition at the time of the
accident was one in which he had an existing
disease which cooperated with the accident in
causing his death. This co1npels us to conclude
that the accident cannot be considered the sole
cause of insured's death, and from this actual
picture, we must conclude that this case is one
which falls in the third class of cases set forth
in Mr. Justice Larsen's opinion in Browning vs.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, Supra, and the
cases there cited."
(a)

This Case at Least Belongs i.n Category Three
of Browning vs. Equitable Life.

It is submitted that the case at bar belongs with
the Tucker case in category three. The court ~here said,
"The record contains no testimony contrary
to these facts and opinions given by Dr. Richards
who was called by Plaintiffs and upon whose
testimony their case muRt stand. The picture of
the insured's physical condition could be enlarged
11
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and made even plainer by including other testimony given by both Dr. Richards and Dr. Viko.
The reco-rd shows conclusively that there is no
conflict in the evidence as to the material issues
of this case.
"That Mr. Nichols had been suffering from
high blood pressure for at least a year prior to
his fall must be accepted as true. There is not
any evidence to the contrary. He had been suffering from a known disease for a pe-riod of a
year or longer. This condition or disease was,
in the opinion of the doctors, not only active but
progressive. Both doctors expressed a belief that
the intima of the aorta gave way and caused
death, and this was the result of the diseased
condition which had so weakened this main artery
that it could not stand the increased blood pressure occasioned by the fall, or the strain imposed
upon the aorta after the injury." (155 Pac. 173176). (Emphasis supplied).
These same things may be said in the case at bar.
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the cause of
death. The death certificate (Ex. 2) and the medical
proof of cause of death (Ex. 3) submitted by Dr. Olson
on behalf. of Plaintiff, both recite "cerebral artery em.bolism" and "rheumatic heart disease" as the causes of
death. The .death certificate itself was prima facia evidence of the facts therein stated, including the attending
physician's opinion as to the cause of death. (Sec. 35-220, Utah Code Ann. 1943).

Bozicevich vs. Kenilworth Mere., 58 Utah 458,
199 Pac. 406;
Griffin vs. Prudential Insurance Co., 102 Utah
363, 133 Pac. 2nd 333.

12
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It is stated in the Griff,in case that evidence of the
type contained on the death certificate 1nay be explained
or contradicted by competent evidence. What the corurt
there 1neant by that can best be deter1nined by examining
its sunnuary of the evidence "'"hich it said was sufficient
to explain or contradict the death certificate and to sustain the verdict of the jury. The doctor in that case
arrived after the man was unconscious, and jail inmates
told him the insured had suffered an epileptic fit. An
autopsy did show insured suffered from chronic alcoholisin and incident disorders, but did not confirm epilepsy. There was also no evidence that insured had
ever been known to have suffered from epileptic convulsions. This court there said,
"The fact is that the doctor who filled out
the death certificate admitted that in making such
declaration he relied on statements of other persons at the city jail who had not seen the insured
suffer any epileptic attack and had no knowledge
on which to base their statements. Their staternents to the doctor on which he relied were perfectly conjectural. The declaration in the death
certificate was almost if not entirely destroyed by
the admissions of the ones who were instrumental
in causing such state1nent to be inserted. It is
true the doctor found a condition, which unde-r
certain circumstances might produce convulsions
similar to epilepsy, but he gave no professional
opinion under oath that the fall was caused by
an attack of epilepsy and indeed in view of his
admitted uncertainty as to causal factors the jury
would have been justified in disbelieving his
opinion even if he had expressed an opinion under
the circumstances."

13
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Contrary to the Griffiln case, Dr. Olson, who signed
the death certificate and the medical proof of cause of
death, stated in his testimony at the trial that it was
still his opinion that the cause of death was a cerebral
embolism (Tr. 51-57). Dr. Peltzer was of the same opinion (Tr. 81). Dr. Goddard, the only other physician
testifying at the trial, said, "I would say that I am in
no position to venture an opinion due to the fact I was
not present at the man's death," and wrote on Exhibit
1, "'This man has since expired, at which time I was not
in attendance, but apparently due to his heart disease."
(Tr. 70). Counsel for Plaintiff tried to elicit testimony
that an autopsy might have shown something different as
the immediate cause of death (Tr. 41), but while Dr.
Olson ad1nitted that there were other possibilities, the
best the c.ounsel could get from him was,

Q. In view of that then, Doctor, I take it that
your statement as to the cause of death carne
upon the death certificate as cerebral artery
embolism is subject to change~
A. Yes, if I saw proof by autopsy I was in error,
I certainly would change it. It still is my
best judgment that it ·is the cause of death,
but I have no proof except judgment b~ed
on symptoms the last moments of his life."
(Tr. 51). (Emphasis supplied).
Upon cross examination, Dr. Olson said,
Q. You state in the death certificate you signed
and in this· medical proof of cause of death,
Exhibit 3, "cerebral artery embolism" as the
cause of death, Doctor~
A. Yes, that is my judgntent.

14
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Q.

That is your signature'
.A.. Yes.
Q. That is still your best judgment~
.A.. It is n1y best judgment. It may be in error,
but that is what I thought at the time.
Q. You have heard nothing since to make you
change your mind~
_A_. There is a difference between the way
patients die when they have pulmonary
embolism and when they have cerebral embolism.
Q. And from what Mrs. White told you, you
were and are of the opinion it was cerebral
artery embolism~
A. Yes (Tr. 56-57).
Dr. Peltzer's testimony was substantially similar:

Q. I asked you if you had an opinion as to the
cause of death, the immediate cause of death
based on the history of the disease and Mrs.
White's description of his last hour.
A.

Well, I have several. I will have to conceive
of several things that could have caused it,
one of which is the most likely possibility,
it is cerebral embolism.

Q. You think that is the most likely~
A.

Statistically, yes ( Tr. 81).

And at Tr. 83, under cross examination by Plaintiff's counsel, he said,
embolism~

Q.

One could be pulmonary

A.

As I heard the testimony, the reason I put
cerebral before· pulmonary, the history is not
15
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

pulmonary embolism but more likely cerebral
embolism.
You wouldn't say pulmonary embolism is
not possible~
It isn't completely impossible. It is possible.
As to the other causes, they are possible~
You might understand they are cardiac
causes.

Q. I am talking about this death certificate.
A. They are related diseases of his heart.
Q. The death certificate is not conclusive as far
as we are concerned~
A. In the absence of autopsies, no.
Other than these doctors quite honest admissions
that it was "possible" they could be in error if an autopsy
showed otherwise, but that they did not think so, there
is no evidence explaining or contradicting the death
certificate, and no issue for the jury on the question of
cause of death save speculation on whether an autopsy
would have shown these two heart specialists to have
been in error.
The Tenth Circuit Court in applying Utah Law to a
similar policy in

Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York vs. Hassing, 134 F'ed. 2nd 714
said,
"It is incumbent upon one asserting liability
under ·a contract of this type, to show by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that death resulted directly from bodily injuries independently
a.nd exclusively of all other causes; effected solely
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through external, violent, and accidental means,
\vhich necessarily implies that death did not result indirectly from disease or bodily infirmity.
[Citing cases]. The jury was so instructed, and
its verdict was in the affir1native. If there are
any facts or reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the fact tending to support the jury verdict, it must stand, although the jury may have
been justified in reaching a contra conclusion.
But the verdict Inust find some substantially affirmative support in the facts and circumstances.
"• ~ * the law contents itself with probabilities,
and declines to wait for certainty before drawing
its conclusions." Lewis v. Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corporation, 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E.
56, 57, 7 A.L.R. 1129. But the law is not cont·ent
with mere possibilities, conjecture:s, or surmises.
The jury is not permitted to guess or sp-eculate
on the cause of death. (Emphasis supplied).
See also
Troutman vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
125 Fed. 2nd 769.
(b)

Plaimtijf Failed to Meet Her Burden of Proof.

As succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his
concurring opinion in the Griffin case (133 Pac. 2nd 333
at 343),
"The burden of proof that (a) The insured
suffered injuries (b) The injuries directly caused
the death (c) Such cause was independent of all
other efficient cooperating causes (d) The injuries occurred solely through violent means, external means and accidental means, is on the
Plain tiff."
Another similar analysis of what a contractual provision similar to this one in the case at bar requires of
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a Plaintiff was the following statement by the Pennsylvania court in
Lucas vs. Metropolita;n Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa.
277, 14 At. (2d) 85, 131 A.L.R .. 235.

"Where the liability of the insurance carrier
is so restricted, it is not sufficient for the insured
to establish a direct causal relation between the
accident and the loss or disability. l-Ie must show
that the resulting condition was caused solely by
external and accidental .means, and if the proof
points to a pre-existing infirmity or abnormality
which may have been a contributing. factor, the
burden is upon him to produce further evidence
to exclude that possibility." (131 A.L.R. 235,
239).
To attempt to meet. this burden in the case at bar,
Plaintiff did show that the insured did suffer an injury,
the bump on the leg in the accident described by Mrs.
White. To show that the bump on the leg directly caused
the death independently of all other cooperating causes,
Plaintiff must establish the following syllogism: (1) The
bump caused the gangrene, independently of any other
·cause; (2) the gangrene caused the amputation; (3) the
amputation created a blood clot which lodged in the
brain, (4) therefore, the bump independently, directly,
and exclusively of all other causes, resulted in the death
of Milton H. White.
Plaintiff tried to establish this syllogism in one
easy step in her counsel's hypothetical questiqn to Dr.
Olson, the first question app·earing at pages 41-44 of the
transcript, and the second on pages 44 and 45 .. To these
questions, Dr. Olson had no opinion ( Tr. 44, 45). Plain-
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tiff like,Yise failed to establish any evidence to support
points (1) and (3) of the syllogism.
.L\s to the argument that the bmnp on the leg was
the sole cause of the gangrene, Dr. Goddard, the man
\Vho performed the operation and had Mr. White under
his care, testified on behalf of Plaintiff just the opposite.
A pathological examination of the diseased leg showed
that :Jlr. '''hite had also been suffering from obliterating
thrombo-angiitis of the vessels of the right leg, which
condition is also known as Buerger's Disease (Exhibit
5 and Tr. 45 and 73). With respect to this situation, Dr.
Goddard on cross examination said :
"Q.

Now, with a man who is suffering from
heart disease of the type Mr. White was,
and Buerger's Disease, would it be more likely that a blow of the type described; that is,
with the sharp edge of the bench on the
back of the calf, would cause some injury to
the vein or artery than not~

A.

With respect to the Buerger's Disease, it
would be more likely than with a person not
so afflicted.

Q. Would it have any effect on the circulatory
system~

A. I don't think, on a blow on the leg.
Q. With Buerger's Disease it would~
A. Yes, they apparently were.
Q. And they would be damaged and more susceptible to injury~
A. Yes." (Tr. 74).
Dr. Peltzer came to the same conclusion:
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"Q.

Now, Doctor, if a man of about Mr. White's
physical characteristics, which you heard described, were not suffering from Buerger's
disease and from rheumatic heart condition,
would a blow of the type you heard described
in court today be likely to cause an injury
to the arteries which would result in gangrene~

A.

I would have to say that a similar blow on
a normal artery would be unlikely to cause
gangrene in extremities and in an otherwis~
normal body." (Tr. 80).

There was no evidence to go to the jury to the effect
that a blow similar to that described in 1\frs. White's
testimony would be likely to cause an injury to the circulatory system, resulting in the gangrene, of a person
not suffering from a rheumatic heart or Buerger's Disease.
Similarly, Plain tiff failed to show the third step of
her required syllogism. Dr. Olson, in his discussion of
the circulatory system, stated that for a clot originating
in the leg, as a result of the operation, to reach the
brain causing death by cerebral embolism would be, by
the nature of the circulatory system, an impossibility,
except for the very unusual situation of a paradoxical
embolism (Tr. 60-61). Even its name indicates its rarity.
Dr. Olson said he would not expect it (Tr. 61) and that
it was so improbable and infrequent as to cause a report
in the medical journal (Tr. 63), and that it did not occur.
in this case (Tr. 64). Dr. Goddard said it would be very
rare (Tr. 72) and Dr. Peltzer testified with respect to
paradoxical embolisn1, "I believe Dr. Olson quoted well
20
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""hen he said it is such a rarity that it is still a reason
to publish an article in medical literature. I couldn't
tell yon statistically, but it is an extremely rare incident.
It is so rare that there are no statistics-only isolated
cases reported." (Tr. 80).
Again, no evidence of any affirmative nature, that
the death dealing clot could have resulted from the operation, "Tas produced by Plaintiff. Can a jury be perInitted to speculate on the occasion of a paradox so rare
that it is cause for reports in medical journals~ Is an
honest admission by a doctor that he could be wrong,
as there is no certainty short of an autopsy, evidence
to be considered and speculated upon by a jury as bearing upon a possibility of a cause of death other than
that testified to by the doctor and unsupported by any
other evidence~

Mutual Life v~. Hassing, Supra, and Trout;nan vs. Metropolitan Life, Supra.
Contrast the overwhelming evidence that the clot
came from the diseased heart. White had a rheumatic
heart. Typical of a rheumatic heart is an off-beat known
as auricular fibrillation (Tr. 53). A concommitant of
auricular fibrillation is the throwing off into the bloodstream of clots called emboli ( Tr. 54, 79). White had
an embolic episode in the spleen in November, 1948. He
had another in his leg in September, 1949. He had a third
in his kidneys in January, 1950 (Tr. 5,5). Dr. Olson,
without contradiction, said he had a fourth in the brain
causing the death ( Tr. 56, Exs. 2 and 3). All of these
¥Jere without dispute in the evidence.
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Plaintiff has also suggested one other syllogism to
tie the bump .on the leg to the death. That line of reasoning is: (1) Bump caused the gangrene (2) Gangrene
caused the operation (3) The ope·ration put Milton H.
White in a state of decline of health from which he
eventually died. It has already been shown that point
one is fallacious and that the gangrene could not have
come from the bump in the absence of the Buerger's
Disease condition or the diseased heart condition. Likewise, Plaintiff failed to establish any evidence to support this point three. Dr. Olson, in answer to Plaintiff's
long, hypothetical question which stressed the supposed
decline in health after the operation and concluded:

"Q. Doctor, would you say it is possible, having
in mind the hypothetical question, the long
one I asked you a short time ago, is it possible this blow on the leg would have a causal
connection on the man's death~
A. I have no opinion on it.
Q. You have no opinion~
A.· No, I don't know.
Q. Would you say it is impossible ?
A. I don't know, there is no way to tell." (Tr.
45).
0

Another hypothetical question was put to Dr. Goddard, another of Plaintiff's witnesses (Tr. 68):

"Q.

Now, doctor, in view of that information, and
in view of what you saw of the patient in
September, October, November and December
of 1949, and in view of the embolectomy, the
amputation of the leg, and the resultant con22
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~\..

finement to his bed, and his house, I will ask
you if you have an opinion as to whether
or not the injury described as a bump, or a
knock on the rear of the calf of his leg, on
the rear of the calf of the right leg causing
pain then and thereafter, would have causal
connection to the n1an's death on February
14th, 1950,
I did feel it would necessarily have to a have
a causal effect.
MR. SNOW: That is all."

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BILLINGS:
"Q. You say "necessarily," Doctor, on what basis
do you reach that conclusion 1
A. I would reach that conclusion on the basis.
that anything that would damage one's health
with an already existing condition, such as
Mr. White had, would hasten his demise.
(Emphasis supplied).
Q. That is the only meaning of the word "necessarily," is that correct then 1
A. In my opinion, it would."
Dr. Goddard also said the operation was over with
(Tr. 72), and the recovery was normal, thus breaking
the chain of causation of this theory of Plaintiff's. Dr.
Olson described a new heart attack coming in January
1950 (Tr. 55) which is a new cause, independent of the
blow on the leg. Counsel for Plaintiff also attempted
to get some solace for this desperate theory from Dr.
Peltzer (Tr. 84) :
"Q. You heard Dr. Goddard, I suppose, when he
said that the injury which has been de·scribed
23
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here today necessarily had a causal connection to death, I suppose you disagree with
that~

A. Not completely.
Q. You do not C9·mpletely disagree with it~
A. No.
BY MR. BILLINGS.:
Q. What do you mean by that, Doctor~
A. I mean if a man is suffering from a serious
cardiac disease which requires such measures
done to him.
Q. Drugs~
A. Digitalis and mercuhydrin, that is a usual
indication of advanced heart disease and the
method in which they were employed. Anything that would happen to that man, let's
say, in his diseased cardiac state, for instance, he might have fallen out of bed, what
to other individuals was common trauma.,
he might have in a way aggravated this condition, any incident in his life, let's say, that
interfered with his normal cardiac condition
would assist.
Q. Would you say that that type of trauma you
have described, could have caused his d~ath
independently of the cardiac disease from
which he was suffering~
After some objection, the answer at page 85:
"A.

Not in a normal healthy individual, I am trying to put emphasis on the fact that in the
presence of cardiac disease, instances of
traumatic injury, not important to the human
body, and in the presence of cardiac disease
they do aggravate the condition.
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Q. You 1nean this blow fron1 the bench, you
have described, 1night have had some connection 'vith his death, is that right'
.A.. And also I am trying to describe the fact, if
a 1uan has disease of the arteriesQ. Buerger's Disease'
.A.. Buerger's Disease, that a blow in those circumstances "~ould cause a more significant
injury than if he didn't have Buerger's Disease so the blo'v plus the fact he did have
that disease 'Yould aggravate the heart disease n1ore."
It is submitted, as was said by this court in the
Tucker case, supra,
"Where the record discloses no dispute concerning insured's physical condition over the year
prior to his injury, and there being no dispute
as to the cause of death, we must find the court
erred in submitting the facts to the jury and
erred in giving its instructions. In view of the
record, the court should have given Defendant's
requested instruction No. 1 directing the jury
to return a verdict of no cause of action in favor
of D·efendant and against the Plaintiff."
POINT II.
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION No. 9.

Instruction No. 9 ( R. 22) provides,
"You are instructed that where an accidental
injury sets in motion or starts renewed activity
of a previously existing but quiescent disease or
condition, and such disease or condition contributes to the death, after having been so precipi-
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tated by the accident, the disease is not a diroot
or indirect cause of death, nor is it a contributing
cause as in the meaning of the language of insurance certificates. In such case, the accident is a
sole cause of death.
"·Therefore, if you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the deceased Milton H. White
had previously been afflicted with a heart condition which condition was not active and which
condition was not to be expected to cause his
imminent death, and, if you further find by a preponderance in the evidence that the injuries suffered by the said MiJ_ton H. White· set in motion
or renewed the activity of said heart condition,
and that therefore said heart condition contributed to the cause of death, I instruct you, in such
event, you must return a verdict in favor of the
· Plaintiff and against the Defendant since under
such a finding, the accident, under the law is considered to be the sole cause of death."
This instruction is an obvious attempt to apply
the rule of the Lee case,
Lee vs. New York Life Insurance Co., 95
Utah 445, 82 Pac. 2d 178

to the case at bar, but, as said by the court in the Tucker
case, the facts in that case were materially different.
"Lee previously had been ill from gall bladder -trouble, but at the time of the accident this
condition was not active but dormant, and was
completely walled off, and had not the injury
directly disturbed this and caused it to become
active, the condition which was dormant and w~ll
ed off might never have contributed to the Insured's death."
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In the case at bar, the heart condition was anything
but latent or dorn1ant. ,V.hite had an e1nbolic episode
in 19-±S (Tr. 70). He had another in 1949 ('~rr. 71). He
was hospitalized in Septen1ber 19-±9 for congestive heart
failure. He was being actiYely treated with the drugs
mercuhydrin and thion1erin, which are heart medicines
used in advanced heart disease and congestive failure
(Tr. 70). The condition of l\Ir. 'Vhite's heart was not
set in motion by the blow on his leg any more than Mr.
Nichols' arteries 'Yere hardened or his blood pressure
raised by the fracture in the Tucker case.
The distinction between the case at bar and one
where the Lee doctrine can be applied is well exemplified by a recent decision of the Tenth Circuit applying Utah Law in a diversity case:

Kansas City Life Ins. Co. vs. Hayes, 184
Fed 2d 327.
In that case, a man in previously good health fell
down the stairs in his home and died within a few hours.
After an autopsy, the report gave the cause of death as
first, multiple traumata to almost all portions of the
body, and second, chronic, recurrent rheumatic heart
disease with formation of ball thrombus in the left
auricle appendage which became dislodged into the
mitral orifice, occluding same. Another doctor, a heart
specialist, who observed the autopsy, stated that in his
opinion the ball thrombus was loosened by the fall of the
deceased and that it eventually occluded the valve of the
heart causing death. From his examination, he considered the insured's heart essentially normal for a man
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his age and showed nothing which in his opinion would
cause death in the absence of the fall. There was also
other evidence to the effect that the ball thrombus was
caused by a rheumatic heart. The Circuit Court said

'

"In sum, it seems to be agreed that the immediate cause of death was a dislodged ball thrombus which occluded the mitral valve shutting off
circulation. There was a difference of opilnion on
whether the fall caused the thrombus to dislodge
and occlude the mitral valve, or whether the
occlusion was caused directly or indirectly from
a diseased heart. . . . We agree with the trial
court that the facts in our case presented a jury
question whether the accidental fall set in motion
a latent or dormant disease condition resulting
in death of the insured." (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, there was no difference of
opinion as to the source of the embolus. Both Dr. Olson
and Dr. Peltzer ~greed it came from the heart. In the
case at bar, the heart disease of White was not dormant
or latent but active, and though partially under control
by the medication prescribed by Dr. Goddard, and later
by Dr. Olson, it still was throwing off emboli which
blocked arteries in the spleen, leg, the kidneys, and finally
the brain.
It is submitted that in giving the jury instruction
No. 9 the court submitted to it an issue for which there
was no evidence in support and opened the door to sheer
speculation, bias, and prejudice.
Griffin vs. Prud,ential Ins. Co., Supra.
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II

POINT III.
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING THE JURY
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8.

Instruction No. 8 (R. 21) provides,
Hlf vou find that the deceased Milton H.
,v---hite h~d ailn1ents or infirmities of the body
at the time he suffered an injury, by reason of
which ailments or infirn1ities he had a weakened
condition "Tithout normal powers of resistance, I
instruct you that he might nevertheless have met
his death by reason of external, violent, and accidental injury within the 1neaning of the insurance
certificate in this case.
'•If you find, in the preponderance of the
evidence that he suffered an injury because of
external, violent, and accidental means, and if
you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that such injury was a real, direct, and efficient
cause of his death, Plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict even though you might believe that a
normal or more robust person would have had a
greater capacity to resist such an injury and
might not have been killed by it."
That instruction is another approach to the second
causation theory of Plaintiff discussed above. It has
already been shown that all the evidence was to the effect
that in the absence of his heart condition and Buerger's
Disease, the slight blow on White's leg would never have
started a chain resulting in death. It has also been
shown that this chain was broken by the recovery from
the operation testified to by Dr. Goddard, and that another heart attack occurred in January, 1949 introducing a new and independent cause as testified to by Dr.
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Olson. Dr. Olson also testified that the probable cause
of the nausea which Plaintiff claims weakened White
was the drugs he was taking for his heart condition (Tr.
47, 62), and that it was not typical of a recovery from
amputation. Dr. Goddard testified the recovery was
normal and that they were discussing a prosthetic device
when Mr. White died (Tr. 72).
Or, if this instruction be applied to the first syllogism mentioned above, Plain tiff has likewise failed to
produce any evidence to support that line of argument.
But even if it be accepted, arguendo, that the blow caused
the clot in the leg which caused the gangrene, independently of any other cause, still Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the clot originating in the leg
went to the brain causing the death.
In addition to the fact that the evidence does not
support a finding of the jury on this instruction, the
instruction itself does not correctly state the law applicable to the contract between the Defendant association
and Plaintiff's decedent. The certificate (Ex. A) provides in part, "there shall be no liability whatever when
disease, defect, or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause
of death." The By-Laws state in part, "there shall be
no liability whatever, unless death or disability results
wholly from the injury, nor when any disease, defect,
or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause of death, disability, or injury."
In
Tucker vs. New Y ark Life, supra
the court found from the undisputed evidence, that
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II

i

becau~e of the decedent's diseased and weakened con-

dition, his artery Hrould not stand the increased blood
pressure ocra~ioned by the fall or the strain imposed
upon the aorta after the injury." Such a finding fits
neatly into instruction No. 8, but this court, with an
insurance contract not nearly so restrictive as the one
now before it, placed that case, without a dissent, in
category three and reversed a judgment entered on a
yerdict for the Plaintiff.
It must be recognized that some courts have allowed
recovery 'vhere there is no active disease, but merely
a frail or ·infirm condition of the body which renders
the individual more liable to serious effects from an
injury than an average person. See 1 Appleman, Insurance La.w and Practice, Sec. 403, Page 500, and cases
therein cited. But that is not this case, any more than
the Tucker case fell within that category. Compare, for
example,
Frame vs. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
358 Pa. 103, 56 Atl. 2d 76
which the Pennsylvania court held to be within the class
of cases mentioned in Appleman, with
Lucas vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., S·upra..
In the latter case, Plaintiff had an automobile accident in 1926 which resulted in a bone deformity which
could have caused arthritis. The suit was for arthritic
disability claimed to have resulted from a fall in 1938.
The court held the 1938 fall merely accelerated and
aggravate·d the progress of the disease. In the Frame
case, the decedent was 71 and was partially paralyzed
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from an earlier cerebral hemorrhage. He died after
suffering a broken leg and ribs and hip· resulting frmn
a fall downstairs. The court there sustained recovery
on the ground there was no evidence the disability
caused the fall.
Some respect must be given to the provisions of the
contract. It is submitted that an existing disease or
infirmity which aggravates the effect of the injury,
Tucker vs. New York Life Ins. Co., supra, or is aggravated by the injury, Runyon vs. Commonwealth Casualty
Co., 109 N.J.L. 238, 160 At. 402, is a contributing cause,
Railway Mail .Ass'n vs. Stauffer, 152 F. 2d 146, (C.C.,
D·.C.) Railway Mail.Ass'n vs. Weir, 156 N.E. 921 (Ohio).
To come within the Appleman class of cases and n1eet
the terms of the policy, the instruction 1nust make clear
that the ailments or infirmities are wholly inactive.
Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance So., supra; Kelly
vs. Prudential Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 143, 6 At. 2d 55; Leland
vs. United Commercial Travelers, 233 Mass. 58, 124 N.E.
517. This, instruction No. 8 fails to do. By thus leaving
it open to the jury, the court authorized the jury to completely disregard all the evidence as to the active nature
of White's heart condition and Buerger's Disease, other
than the finding that they made him more susceptible
to injury, of which fact there was no question.
Nor do instructions No. 5 and No. 6 correct the prejudicial errors in instructions No. 8 and No. 9. All the
former do is present instructions conflicting with and
contradictory to No. 8 and No. 9 as to the law pertaining
to the insurance policy in issue and what Plaintiff 1nust
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show to recover. And, as ""as said by this court inK onold
vs. Rio Grande Western Railzoay Co., 21 Utah 379, 60
Pac. 1021,
''Instructions on a material point in the case
which are inconsistent or contradictory shall not
be given. The giving of such instructions is error
and is sufficient grounds in a reversal because
it is impossible after the verdict to ascertain
which instruction the jury followed or what influence the erroneous instruction had in their deliberations. This has been so uniformly held that
citations are unnecessary."
See also

Sorensen vs. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 Pac. 72,
and

Jensen vs. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 366,
270 Pac. 349.
Instructions No. 8 and No. 9 introduced before the
jury facts which were not presented by the evidence and
were well calculated to induce them to suppose that such
state of facts, in the opinion of the court, was possible
under the evidence and might be considered by them as
a basis for imposing liability on Defendant association.
Giving such instructions constitutes reversible error.
Griffin vs. Prudential Ins. Co., supra;
Parker vs. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116
Pac. 2d 425;
Mehr vs. Child, 102 Utah 151, 140 Pac. 2'd

',''

1.'

772.

I•
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the trial court
was in error in not granting Defendant's motion for a
directed verdict, that the error was compounded in submitting the case to the jury under erroneous instructions which raised issues not substantiated by the -evidence and that the court perpetuated such error in failing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial or for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same
grounds.
Respectfully submitted,

PETER W. BILLINGS.,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN,
MOFFAT & MABEY,
.Attorneys for Appellant.
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